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A Search for Legal Norms
in Contemporary Situations of
Civil Strife
Ross R. OglesbyPROFESSOR MORTON KAPLAN, in a masterly volume on
international politics, has delineated the characteristics of the
old international order, the balance of power system, as well as the
prevailing international system which he designates "the loose bi-
polar system."' In a later book,
he and Professor Katzenbach
THE AUTHOR: Ross R. OGLESBY (Re- explored the effect on interna-
ceived his A.B., Georgetown, M.A., Uni-
versity of Virginia, and Ph.D., Duke tional law of this monumental
University) is a Professor of Govern- change in the nature of the in-
ment and International Relations at The ternational system.2  Their as-
Florida State University, Tallahasee,Florida. sumption is that political prin-
ciples and practices, in both
domestic and international com-
munities, have their impact on law; that in fact the prevailing norms
of law are, to a considerable extent, the products of - while con-
currently serving - the political environment in which they operate.
However, these characteristics of the balance of power system need
not detain us in this context, for the emphasis here is upon the
requirements of non-interference and independence as essential safe-
guards for the viability of the balance of power system. Principal
inputs into that system sprang from the developing nationalism of
the period. This sentiment not only gave the nation-state a strength
and cohesion which other political institutions lacked, but it effec-
tively limited expansion at boundaries where national sentiment
ended. This tended to reinforce an international system in which
the key role was played by sovereign and independent states. Con-
trol of one state by another would interfere with the necessary flexi-
bility of alliances. Sovereignty was the legal norm, and its essential
1 M. KAPLAN, SYSTEM AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1957). See
W. Fox, THE SUPER-POWERS 97, 98 (1944); Kaplan, Balance of Power, Bipolarity
and Other Models of International Systems, in INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS IN INTER-
NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS 33 (1969).
2 M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1961).
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counterpart was non-interference in the internal affairs of another
State. The concept of belligerency, founded on the assumption of
non-interference, met the requirements of the balance of power
system in situations of internal wars. While the rule of non-inter-
ference was primarily designed to aid the principal actors in the
system, for a variety of reasons the same principle was applied to the
small powers.' In an international system which, for its own stabil-
ity, required standards that limited war (without inquiring into the
justice of the cause), and further required flexibility of alliances
(discounting ideological considerations), the norms of sovereignty
and non-intervention played a central role. Rules of neutrality,
permitting only a minimum of interference, were developed to
govern the conduct of non-belligerents.
In the loose bipolar international system, which developed fol-
lowing World War II, there are at least two major power blocs
which tend to be permanent because they are based on long-term
interests.4  The norms of non-interference in the internal affairs
of other States are no longer a central feature of the system. Inter-
dependence within the blocs gives positive motivation for interven-
tion. Concentration of capabilities in the two leading blocs make
their role of intervenors inevitable. Unlike the balance of power
system, loose bipolar system interventions occur within the bloc
States by the major bloc power, rather than in colonial and depend-
ent areas as had been the case under the balance of power system.
In the loose bipolar system, States have diverse reasons for con-
tinuing the old norms of international law. The non-bloc States
still have a strong interest in preserving the rule of non-interven-
tion.5 The smaller States in the blocs likewise dedicate a consider-
able effort toward the preservation of the principle,6 as non-inter-
vention and prohibition on the use of third power force directed
toward their internal affairs correspond with their stated interests.
But the same is not true with the major bloc powers. Bloc leaders
may find it to their advantage to prevent other States from using
force in such a manner, as they did in the Suez Crisis of 1956, but
they find it difficult to abstain when block interests are threatened.
The opposing major bloc power will permit this intervention be-
3 Id. at 39-40.
4 On the nature of the loose bipolar system see M. KAPLAN, Supra note 1; M.
KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 2, at 50-62; P. FLIESS, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN THE BIPOLAR WORLD ch. 1 (1968).
5 P. FLIESS, supra note 4, at 146.
6 M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 2, at 54.
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cause its own interests are best served by permitting the establish-
ment of such a bloc law of intervention.
The rule of non-intervention, if it is still an applicable form,
applies primarily to the Third World States. The rule is here en-
forced by the nuclear balance between the blocs.
The legal values associated with non-intervention . .. meet far less
support under current international conditions than they did during
the balance of power period. Moreover, -the strong stands taken
by the new nations and by many influential nations against 'the
vestiges of colonialism have the function of further reducing the
insulation of the national-state from the application of external
and international pressures.7
DECLINE OF SYSTEMIC NORMS FOR
SITUATIONS OF CIVIL STRIFE
In short, in the classical balance of power system, States had
control over their own domestic affairs and forcible intervention
into the internal affairs of another state was system-disturbing. Na-
tional leaders, in both large and small States, were committed to
the preservation of national integrity. Recognition of belligerency
in situations of civil war performed a useful function in isolating
internal wars and maintaining the stability and flexibility of the
system. With the mutation of the international order into the loose
bipolar system, the concept of belligerent recognition passed into
desuetude.8
What has been the fate of insurgent recognition, the norm which
succeeded belligerency as the concept applicable to situations of.
internal war? Insurgency, like belligerency, required a certain
amount of impartiality. It necessitated, at a minimum, the applica-
tion of domestic neutrality laws which placed restraint on citizens.
It also required the State to maintain a stance of impartiality.9
Insurgency replaced belligerency because it was more restrictive
on the activities of the contestants and thus better served an inter-
national community seeking to constrain the use of force.'0 Even
7Id. at 55.
8 This hypothesis is more fully developed in R. OGLESBY, INTERNAL WARS: A
SEARCH FOR NORMATIVE ORDER ch. 7 (under process of publication by Martinus
Nijhoff, The Hague).
9 E. CASTREN, CIVIL WAR 222 (1966); H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 277 (1947). For another scholar holding the view that insurgency
commits the recognizing State to a policy of nonintervention, see J. KUNZ, KRIEGS-
RECHT UND NEUTRALITXSTRECHT (1932).
10 For a brief statement on the law of insurgency see H. LAUTERPACHT, supra
note 9, at 270-311.
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insurgency, however, does not represent the prevailing modality for
dealing with intrastate conflict today, although there continues to be
a tendency to preserve the old pattern of neutrality and non-inter-
vention in civil wars which are classified as "authority" or "separa-
tist" wars." In the typology developed for the context of the
present analysis, intervention appears to be the prevailing pattern
in two other types of civil conflicts - "wars of colonial independ-
ence" and "wars of social change."
The realities of the world in which we live, and of the inter-
national system which reflects the demands of that world, invite
participation by outside powers in situations of internal war. Signif-
icant factors which make up the realities are mass communication,
rapid transportation, economic interdependence, ideological commit-
ments, and revolutionary parties which cut across national boundaries
in their organization and operations. The traditional system built
up shields of State' protection through a formula of sovereignty and
non-intervention, based on spatial criteria. But spatial formulae are
beginning to lose their value as absolutes in a modern world where
functional criteria are apt to be overriding. The functions of de-
fense, economic prosperity, and social interchange are no longer
congruent with the territorial boundaries of States. It seems certain
that in such a fluid world the old norm of non-intervention cannot
escape considerable modulation.
Kaplan's conclusion, based on his observations of the interna-
tional system, is that interventions are to be expected in increasing
numbers since interventionary propensities are heightened by the
nature of the loose bipolar system. 2 While the present interna-
tional system is still a decentralized one in which formal order and
diversity arise from the activities of government carried on largely
within territorial boundaries, intervention is an increasingly signifi-
cant element of the domestic life of many States of the world.
Civil conflicts within a State in particular become the targets of
interventionary activities. In recent times, assistance in men, ma-
terial, and money has become the most ubiquitous form of inter-
national activity in civil conflicts.
Bloc law interventions in civil wars are not necessarily a dys-
function of the system, for they perform a policing role for main-
11 As used here, "authority wars" are defiined as those in which one set of elites or
authority figures are attempting to replace another.
12 Kaplan, Intervention in Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL AsPECTS OF CIVIL
STRIFE 92 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964).
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taining bloc order and solidarity. In this sense they form an inte-
grative function for the international community.'1
Intervention in civil strife is not, of course, a new phenomenon.
Such interventions have been known for centuries. Their lineage
may be traced back to repeated participation of national forces in
the religious and civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies. It is only in the ideologically oriented twentieth century
that interferences in support of the incumbents or insurgents have
become a frenzied pattern.
PATTERNS OF INTERVENTION
If one examines some of the major civil wars since World War
II, patterns of intervention begin to display themselves. This is not
to argue that at present there is any fully developed law on the
subject, rather it suggests that, given the "normative force of facts,"
international rules on the subject may be aborning. If we take a
somewhat simplistic model based on the goals of the insurgents, we
can discover the directions in which the rules are being shaped.
For the purpose of the present analysis, civil wars are arranged ac-
cording to a tripartite schema which is tabulated in the Appendix.
Type I conflicts are designated as authority wars. Separatist wars
are included in this category as a modified form of authority war.
The object of the insurgents is either to replace the existing au-
thority with their own government or to separate from the parent
State and take away a portion of the national domain.
Wars in which a colony is attempting to separate from the
mother country are designated as Type II, or colonial wars of na-
tional independence. Type III conflicts are defined as wars of social
change. In this category are placed those struggles in which the
goals of the insurgents are aimed toward effecting major social
changes in the State, whether in the realm of politics, economics, or
any other of the basic subcultures of the society. 14
No attempt has been made here to define "intervention." It
has been used in so many different ways that considerable confusion
has arisen as to its precise meaning. 5 We are using the term here
13 McWhinney, Soviet and Western International Law and Cold War in the Era of
Bipolarity: Inner-Bloc Law in a Nuclear Age, in 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 75 (1963).
14 The above typology of civil wars is a modification of a plan proposed by J.
Rosenau. Rosenau, Internal War as an International Event, in INTERNATIONAL As-
PECTS OF CIVIL STIuFE 63 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964).
15 Burke, The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion, in ESSAYS ON
7NTERVENTION 89, 123 (R. Stanger ed. 1964); F. GROB, THE RELATIVITY OF WAR
AND PEACE (1949).
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as the attitude of an outside State toward a civil war which is not
characterized by the legal norms of insurgency or belligerency, but,
rather, one of active support of one of the contestants to the detri-
ment of the other. Such support may take the form of sending
,:military supplies or personnel as evidence of the sending State's
support of the cause of the recipient or a public and official state-
ment of support and encouragement for one of the contestants.
Under such a definition the United States' relations with Cuba dur-
ing the Castro revolution would not be classed as an intervention
since the sending of military supplies was in response to prior treaty
commitments. 6
An additional caveat needs to be entered. The difficulty of clear
differentiation is illustrated by reference to the conflicts in Burma
from 1948 to 1954. Two of these are placed under the category of
authority or separatist wars. In fact, during this period there were
three revolutions in progress against the newly established Burma
Union. The goals of the Karens can best be described as a Type I
conflict. The aims of the Chinese Nationalists who fled to Burma
and developed revolutionary activity there were somewhat obscure,
but perhaps can still be classed as Type I. The Communist revolu-
tion, however, was clearly a Type III war. The United States sent
military supplies to implement its foreign policy of containing
communism. As might be suspected, the Burmese government used
United States aid indiscriminately against all three revolutionary
constitutents.
The Cuban revolution has been cataloged as an authority war,
for it was so viewed officially by the United States. United States
intervention did not take place until 1961, when it was discovered
that the Castro government was Communist. This would have
placed the revolution under Type III.
When we examine Type II a modality of intervention on behalf
of the insurgents in wars of colonial independence clearly begins to
emerge. The ambience of the international community is unfavor-
able to the continuance of the colonial system. One need only make
a cursory examination of the positions taken on various occasions
by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council to
16 1 am impressed with Rosenau's perceptive analysis of intervention as a sudden
change in the nature of a State's relations. Rosenau, Intervention as a Scientific Con-
cept, in THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 979 (R. Falk ed. 1969).
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discover the strong tide of community sentiment against colonial-
ism.,'
Although the United Nations cannot, by charter provisions, in-
tervene in civil wars unless the situation threatens international
peace and security or violates a cease fire established by the Security
Council, on such occasions where it has not been able to intervene
actively in behalf of the insurgents, it has taken strong positions
through resolutions and declarations supporting the right of self-
determination of the colonists. Type II interventions would appear
to reflect this change in international life and circumstances and in
community expectations - a change toward a philosophical orienta-
tion opposed to colonialism.
An examination of the table illustrating Type III civil wars
demonstrates a consistent pattern of interventions either on behalf
of the insurgents or the incumbents. There would appear to be an
absence of cases in which interventions did not take place. In Type
III the terms "insurgents" and "incumbents" do not always reflect
the realities, as is illustrated by the Hungarian intervention of 1956.
In this situation the incumbents cannot be neatly identified. In the
interest of consistency, interventions to preserve the status quo are
labeled as interventions on behalf of the incumbents. The rationale
for the extensive use of intervention in Type III wars is not difficult
to come by. Type III wars are by and large fought over the same
socio-economic-political issues that orient the struggle between the
East and West. There is a strong possibility that if the insurgents
win, they will adopt a radically new posture in their external rela-
tions. Thus a civil conflict fought over proposed systems of uni-
versal value have more relevance to the affairs of other States, for
insurgent success may be highly infectious and segments of the popu-
lation of other States may find inspiration in the outcome."
DEVELOPING PATTERNS OF BLOC INTERVENTION
Of the eighteen Type III wars examined, by far the most signif-
icant were the interventions of the Soviet Union in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia and of the United States in Lebanon and the Domin-
ican Republic. Russian troops were used in Hungary when the
incumbent government attempted to establish a neutralist position.
By a sort of legerdemain, the Soviet intervention was covered under
17 See Modelski, International Settlement of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 32 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964).
18 Id. at 40. See Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1960).
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the old legal rule that interventions at the request of the estab-
lished government are permissible. The Soviets quickly established
"incumbent" government willing to request Russian help. The
same sort of legerdemain was used by the United States to cover
its intervention in the Dominican Republic. In Lebanon, American
troops also entered at the request of the incumbent and presided
over a political compromise which resulted in placing Lebanon in
the neutralist camp.
Force was used against Hungary in 1956 to retain it within the
Soviet bloc. In 1967 Czechoslovakia attempted to establish a more
independent position for itself, but was brought back by Soviet mili-
tary forces into bloc subservience. Although first press reports indi-
cated that Dubcek had asked for Russian help, a few days later he
denied this and the Russians were left to supply other justifications.19
The justifications, eventually known as the Brezhnev Doctrine,
were given by Sergei Kovalev, a Pravda propaganda specialist, and
appeared in Pravda on September 25, 1968.2o While conceding the
right of socialist States to pursue their socialist goals with freedom,
he contended they were not free to the extent that their decisions
damaged the socialist movement or the fundamental interests of
other socialist States. To the extent that an internal revolution led
the State away from the socialist bloc, it was system damaging and
impermissible.
[W]hen a socialist country seems to adopt -a "non-affiliated"
stand, it retains its national independence, in effect, precisely
because of the might of the socialist community, and above all the
Soviet Union as a central force, Which also includes the might of
its armed forces. The weakening of any of the links -in the world
system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, which
cannot look indifferently upon this.21
He concluded by saying that socialist States respect the norms
of international law, including those of sovereignty and independ-
ence, but insisted that these norms must not be interpreted so nar-
rowly as to force socialist States to remain inactive when they see a
fraternal State imperiled with counterrevolution.
Soviet troops were not used, therefore, to suppress self-determina-
tion, he argued, but to give the Czechoslovakian people a chance
19 The Czechoslovakian crisis cannot unequivocally be classed as a civil strife situa-
tion. However, since the Soviets treated it as such with their talk of "counter-Revolu-
tionaries," it is treated as one.
20 The full text is reprinted at N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 6; 7 INT'L L.
MATERIALS 1323 (1968).
21 Id.
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to work out their socialist destinies within the context of Commun-
ist bloc parameters. He also maintained that the intervention was
not undertaken unilaterally, but only after consultation with the
Warsaw Pact powers and a commitment of active support.
The precedent for 'bloc intervention had already been established
by the so-called Johnson Doctrine enunciated by the President at
!Baylor University in 1965, some four weeks after United States
military intervention in the Dominican Republic. President John-
son pointed out that the United States, as a member of the Organiza-
tion of American States (O.A.S.), had assumed common responsi-
'bilities for dealing with Communist infiltration into the Western
Hemisphere. The United States acted. unilaterally because of time
pressures, but it acted in behalf of the O.A.S. The President saw
significance in that "for the first time in the history of the O.A.S.
[it] has created and it has sent to the soil of an American nation
an international peacekeeping military force."'22 Its continued pres-
ence there guarantees to the Dominican people true self-determina-
tion, under basic bloc requirements of the Punte del Este Resolution:
that there shall be no communist take-over within the Western
Hemisphere. The President assured the Dominican people that "we
intend to work for the self-determination of peoples of the Ameri-
cas within the framework of freedom. ' 23
In short, both the Brezhnev Doctrine and the Johnson Doctrine
make it clear that the principle of self-determination cannot be car-
ried so far as to permit a bloc State to -deviate from the bloc, and
that revolutions which have for their end the severance of the State
from bloc allegiance will invite quick and speedy intervention.
Both doctrines are self-denying to the extent that they explicitly
reject unilateral intervention, except on a temporary and emergency
basis, and insist that intervention by the major bloc power is made
on behalf of the bloc States and with their assistance and concur-
rence.
TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL CONFLICTS
A look at the tables in the Appendix illustrating the three types
of civil conflicts may serve to give some guidelines as to the direction
in which a new international law of internal conflict may be develop-
ing. In Type I wars, which we have designated as authority or
separatist wars, the pattern is clearly for third States to refrain from
22 N.Y. Times, May 29, 1965, at 2, col. 4.
23 Id,
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intervening. 24  We have pointed out that Type I wars generally are
not system-disturbing and hence the pressures for intervention do
not exist. It would appear then, that in such wars a continuation
of the classical pattern, with its concomitant norm of insurgency
(belligerency having passed into desuetude), could provide the suit-
able norm.25
On examining the table of interventions in Type II wars, one
is again confronted with a rather clear pattern - that of interven-
tion in behalf of the insurgents. Two interventions under Type II
are abberational: The United States' support of France in the Indo-
China wars brought about because of the general United States
policy of attempting to contain communism; and the United Na-
tions authorization for British intervention in Southern Rhodesia.
There is clearly a world consensus against colonialism. By 1960
this consensus had crystallized in the adoption of the General As-
sembly Resolution 1514 entitled Granting Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples,26 and strengthened by Resolution 231 12"
which called on the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations to
direct their efforts toward implementing the resolutions.18  The
General Assembly next adopted Resolution 2426 reiterating its posi-
tion taken in previous resolutions and calling on the Specialized
Agencies to work with the Organization for African Unity and
"'with the national liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia, and
the Territories under Portuguese domination" toward achieving in-
dependence for these system-disturbing vestigial pockets of colonial-
sim. 29
With a strong consensus of opposition to colonialism, it can be
correctly assumed that there has been a marked tendency toward
unilateral interventions in support of colonial peoples. The Com-
munists have in fact attempted to establish a norm of international
24 "Authority" is used in the commonly accepted meaning as the right to control,
manage, or determine, rather than the more sophisticated use preferred by Rosenau.
Under his classification Type I wars are called "personnel" wars, Type II are called
"authority" wars, and Type III are called "structural" wars. Rosenau, supra note 14, at
63.
25 A close examination of the Castro rebellion does not clearly indicate any un-
equivocal pattern of insurgent use, although the terms "non-intervention" and "strict
neutrality" were used at various times by American officials.
2 6 G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/L323 & Add.
1-6 (1960).
2 7 G.A. Res. 2311, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/6954 (1967).
28 Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 478
(1969).
29 G.A. Res. 2426, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 61, U.N. Doc. A/7424 (1968).
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law which would permit intervention in support of "wars of na-
tional liberation" but deny support to the colonial powers. Because
of strong cold war overtones in colonial wars, unilateral interven-
tion is system-disturbing and fraught with danger to the peace and
good order of the world community, as the Vietnam interventions
have demonstrated. A simplistic norm of law which would permit
interventions on behalf of the colonists, but prevent it in support
of the incumbent, is inadequate not only because it would be system-
disturbing, but also, as in the case of Southern Rhodesia, contrary
to community interests.
An examination of the practice shows a trend to collective
authorization of interventions through the United Nations."° Inter-
ventions, whether unilateral or multilateral, but legitimated by the
United Nations, have the considerable advantage of bringing the
anti-colonial consensus to bear at the point where it is most repre-
sentative of community interests, thus reducing counter-interventions
and reducing the chance for self-serving national interventions
undertaken under the specious guise of supporting the norm of
anti-colonialism.
Precedent exists to support the growing norm of United Na-
tions control of interventions in colonial wars. The United Na-
tions intervention in the Congo is the classic case. While the Congo
has been classed as a Type I war in the context of this essay because
of the separatist efforts of the Katanga province which triggered
the conflict, it could with equal justification have been catalogued a
Type II war since Belgium's intervention in behalf of Kantanga
had strong colonial overtones. Just criticisms have been leveled at
the United Nations for its confused and awkward role there, but, as
Winston Churchill is reputed to have said about his growing old
age, the alternative would have been worse.
The United Nations, by a resolution of the General Assembly,
authorized Great Britain to intervene in Southern Rhodesia, 1 and
in succeeding resolutions the Assembly and the Security Council
authorized members of the United Nations to intervene in support
of Zimbabwe and the national liberation movement in Southern
Rhodesia. 2  United Nations authority also exists for unilateral or
collective intervention in South Africa in behalf of Southwest
3O ld.
31 G.A. Res. 2012, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6041 (1965);
reprinted in 5 INT'L L. MATERIALS 161 (1966).
321d. The Organization of African Unity, by resolution, called on the African
States to help liberate Southern Rhodesia. See 6 INT'L L. MATERIALS 130 (1967).
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Africa, 3 and in behalf of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. The
General Assembly Resolution 2395 is illustrative of the nature of
appeals for intervention in the three situations in Africa presently
of much concern to the African nations, as well as to the world
'community. The Resolution appealed "to all States to grant the
peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination the moral
and material assistance necessary for the restoration of their inalien-
able rights [of self-determination] .... ,,14
There is emerging then a norm of community control of inter-
vention in wars of colonial independence. Such a development
,should minimize system-disturbing unilateral interventions and bring
consensus to bear in the elimination of intolerable domestic social
orders - intolerable that is from the community viewpoint, because
they threaten the peace of the world. Interventions under the
authority of the United Nations have the required flexibility of
permitting pressure, whether against incumbent or insurgent, at
the point where community requirements demand them. Type II
civil conflicts presently offer the most promising situations for de-
veloping a role for the United Nations in situations of civil strife."
The pattern of intervention in Type III civil conflicts - wars
of social and political transformation - is likewise beginning to
emerge with considerable clarity, although to most international
lawyers the trend appears to be distasteful. The pattern, if not the
norm, was clearly delineated in the Johnson and Brezhnev Doctrines,
and, until such time as cold-war aspirations are mitigated, can be
expected to prevail. The modality is one of bloc intervention to
prevent social and political alterations in the structure of the govern-
ment which would result in a loss of that State from the bloc.
Since the major bloc power usually makes the decision to intervene
and bears the major burden of military personnel and material sup-
plied, the interventions appear to be unilateral. However, more
optimistically (or perhaps euphemistically), one may call these re-
gional interventions. Both the Brezhnev justification and the John-
son speech entered disclaimers of unilateral action based on narrow
State interests. The Czechoslovakian intervention was undertaken
33 G.A. Res. 2426, supra note 29; G.A. Res. 2311, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 50,
U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967). For a complete collection of General Assembly and Se-
curity Counsel Resolutions on South Africa from 1945 to 1964 see U.N. Doc. S/AC
14/L 3/Add (1968). See also, note 34, infra.
34 G.A. Res. 2395, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
35 But see Kaplan, Intervention in Internal War, supra note 12, at 110. Kaplan
concludes that collective interventions "are of dubious workability."
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under the guise of Warsaw Pact policy and the American interven-
tion in the Dominican Republic under the cloak of O.A.S. support.
The rationale for the assumption that a pattern of bloc intervention
will continue for the foreseeable future has already been touched
on. It results from the organized relationships which have cemented
blocs together by joint military command and supply facilities.
They have developed long-range functional plans, including joint
arrangements for military defense, production arrangements, flows
of manpower and material, and location of strategic defense sites.
While such arrangements within the bloc denigrate the complete
independence of bloc components, they do contribute to the stability
of the international system. A State within the geographical pro-
pinquity of a bloc which is socially and politically disoriented from
the other States constitutes a threat to the peace. Illustrations are
the presence of Communist Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, of
South Africa in the ambit of the Organization of African Unity,
and Israel in the area of the Pan-Arab world.
If a revolution occurs in a bloc State which might result in the
severance of the affected State from the structure of the bloc, bloc
leadership is certain to react swiftly and effectively to restore bloc
solidarity. Georg Schwarzenberger, writing within the umbra of
the 1956 Suez crisis in a perceptive article entitled Hegemonial
Intervention, not only foresaw a bloc law of interventions, but
justified it as system-serving, a useful peace-keeping device.86 He
argued that to classify bloc interventions (hegemonial) as purely
self-serving was to take too narrow a view of the process. He felt
that there was at least a grain of truth in the assertion that inter-
ventions of such a nature were in fact in the interest of world peace.
It has been shown that three models of intervention based on
the aims of the insurgents distinctly begin to emerge. A pluralism
of norms would appear to be forming. John Norton Moore has
urged the need for a heterogeneity of norms for dealing with inter-
vention. He suggests that we should have a variety of rules for
dealing with tort claims.17  We agree that international law has
too long been handicapped by attempts to impose monolithic norms.
The result is inflexiblity and the use of subterfuge or legal defiance
in situations where the single norm approach is inapplicable.
If consistent practice hardens into norms of international law,
36 Schwarzenberger, Hegemonial Intervention, 13 Y.B. WORLD AFFAIRs 236
(1969).
37 Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L
L. 209, 217 (1969).
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it would appear that the law of intrastate conflict is developing
heterogeneously along the following lines: continued use of insur-
gency for authority and separatist ways, intervention in colonial
wars of independence under authorization of the United Nations,
and intervention in bloc situations under regional or bloc authority.
APPENDIX
TYPOLOGY OF INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL WARS
Nation None
Authority and Separatist Wars
Colombia X
Paraguay
Burma
(Karens and Chinese Nationali
Tibet X
Cuba X
Muscat & Oman
Yemen
Sudan X
Ruanda X
Nigeria
For For
Insurgents Incum bents
x
sts)
Colonial Wars of Independence
Indonesia
Syria & Lebanon
Phillipines X
Indochina
Malaya
Kenya X
Cyprus
Algeria
Angola
Rhodesia
Wars of Social Change
Greece
Phillipines
China
Burma (Communist)
India
Guatemala
Hungary
Malaya
Lebanon
Indonesia
Date
Type I.
1946-58
1947
1948-54
1950-51
1953-59
1959-70
1962
1963
1963
1967
Type II.
1945-49
1945-46
1945-46
1946-54
1948-57
1952-56
1954-59
1954-61
1961-62
1967
Type III.
1945-49
1946-50
1946-58
1948-54
1948-50
1954
1954
1957-60
1958
1958-59
1970]
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For For
Date Nation None Insurgents Incumbents
Type III. Wars of Social Change
1958-62 Cameroon X
1959-60 Laos X
1960-65 Congo X X
1959 South Vietnam X X
1965 Venezuela X
1965 Dominican Republic X
1968 Czechoslovakia X
